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ABORTION, DIGNITY AND A CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
Rosalind Dixon and Martha Nussbaum 
In the United States, as Reva Siegel has recently noted, the right to abortion has 
increasingly been linked by pivotal justices to the idea of individual human dignity.1 This 
connection between ideas about human dignity and rights of access to abortion also finds support 
in broader comparative context.2   
In Canada, for example, in her concurring judgment in R v. Morgentaler,3 Justice Wilson 
suggested that “respect for human dignity” was central to the issue of access to abortion because 
“the right to make fundamental personal decisions without interference from the state” was a key 
aspect of human dignity, as one of the central values on which the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms 1982 was founded.4 In Germany, in the Abortion I Case,5 the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (GFCC) held that “pregnancy belongs to the sphere of intimacy of the 
woman, the protection of which is guaranteed by the Basic Law”; and further that this sphere of 
intimacy, and the right of self-determination it implied, were “values to be viewed in their 
relationship to human dignity”.6 In the Abortion II Case,7 the GFCC was even more explicit in 
recognizing that access to abortion was supported, or indeed probably even required, by “the 
human dignity of the pregnant woman, her … right to life and physical integrity, and her right of 
personality.”8 In Brazil, in 1999, in the case of a pregnancy involving an anencephalic fetus, the 
Supreme Court of Brazil placed similar reliance on the idea of human dignity—and the capacity 
of “gestating pain, anguish and frustration” in the context of such a pregnancy to cause “violence 
to human dignity”—as the prime basis for invalidating a prohibition on access to abortion in 
                                                      
Our thanks to Mary Anne Case, Vicki Jackson and Reva Siegel for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper; 
and to Emily Tancer and Amy Benford for excellent research assistance.  
1  Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L. J. 
1694 (2008) [hereinafter Dignity and the Politics of Protection]. See e.g. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992) (affirming the central holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that women enjoy a constitutionally 
protected right to terminate a pregnancy prior to viability, and in doing so, holding that prior decisions recognized 
that the Constitution protects “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education” and that “these matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices 
a person may make in a lifetime [are] choices central to personal dignity and autonomy”). For other usages of 
dignity, both explicit and implicit, in U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence at a Supreme Court, and also state level, see 
also Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional 
Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 16 (2004).  
2  Cf. Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Abortion Debate. The Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y 
Política – the Seminar in Latin America on Constitutional and Political Theory [SELA], June 2009, Asunción, 
Paraguay (on file with authors). See also Reva Siegel, Dignity and Reproductive Rights, (forthcoming, 60 Case 
Western L Rev). 
3  [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
4  Id. at166.  
5  39 BVerfGE I (1975).  
6  As discussed further below, this was also the axis according to which the Court suggested fetal interests should 
be viewed. See notes 21-22 infra. 
7  88 BVerfGE 203 (1993). 
8  See translation of Abortion II provided by DONALD P. KOMMERS in THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 350 (2d ed., 1997)  
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such circumstances.9 More recently, in Colombia in 2006, in holding that the Colombian 
Constitution protects certain minimal rights of access to abortion, the Colombian Constitutional 
Court cited a concern for human dignity as a basis for striking down the criminalization of 
abortion in three sets of circumstances: where a pregnancy is the result of rape; involves a non-
viable fetus or threatens a woman’s life or health.10 In other countries, such as Australia, the idea 
of human dignity has also been relied on to support recognition of related reproductive rights 
claims, such as the freedom free from involuntary sterilization.11  
Likewise at an international level, in recent years, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee has held that a concern for human dignity implies limits on states’ freedom to restrict 
access to legal abortion services. Art 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights prohibits state connect that is “cruel and inhuman”, and this, according to the Committee, 
prohibits states party from any action which infringes “the dignity and the physical and mental 
integrity of the individual”. 12 Where carrying a fetus to term would involve significant physical 
or psychological harm to a woman, the Committee has further held, this will directly violate this 
guarantee of individual dignity and integrity in Art 7.13  
At the same time, the idea of dignity as a constitutional value that supports a right of 
access to abortion also remains under-theorized in comparative constitutional scholarship. This is 
particularly so when it comes to the relationship between human dignity and women’s physical 
and psychological health or integrity. There is a deep body of theoretical writing dating back (in 
the Western tradition14) at least to the ancient Greek and Roman Stoics, and prominently 
exemplified in the writings of Immanuel Kant, which supports the idea that respect for human 
dignity involves seeing a human being as an end and not a mere means. This respect involves a 
reciprocal willingness, on the part of individuals, to treat others as subjects and not merely 
objects, and thus entails the protection of areas of freedom around people so that they can 
determine their own destiny in areas of central concern.15 There have also been numerous 
attempts, both judicial and scholarly, to connect this idea of dignity to the specific abortion 
context. By contrast, with the exception of previous work by one of us in this area, there have 
been few attempts at a theoretic level to connect the idea of human dignity to claims by 
individuals to a certain threshold level of material, physical and psychological well-being– i.e. 
                                                      
9  Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental - DF 54/2004 [Translation by Amy Benford, On with 
Authors]. See further also Debora Diniz, Selective Abortion in Brazil: The Anencephaly Case, 7 Developing World 
Bioethics 1471 (2007). 
10  Columbian Constitutional Court Decision C-355 of 2006.  
11  In Australia, for example, the High Court of Australia held that the right to bodily security was underpinned by 
the idea of human dignity, or that “each person has a unique dignity which the law respects and which it will 
protect”, and that respect for human dignity requires “that the whole personality be respected: the right to physical 
integrity is a condition of human dignity but the gravity of any invasion of physical integrity depends on its effect 
not only on the body but also upon the mind and on self-perception”: see Department of Health v. JWB (“Marion’s 
Case”), (1992) 175 C.L.R. 218.  
12  See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CCPR General Comment No. 20 (1992), available 
online at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/6924291970754969c12563ed004c8ae5?Opendocument 
13  See Llantoy Huamán v. Peru (1153/03).  
14  For related ideas in Asian traditions, see generally AMARTYA SEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES (1997). 
15 Siegel refers to this as “dignity as liberty,” but, as we shall argue, this locution is misleading: dignity entails 
liberty, but is not equivalent to liberty. See generally Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 1.  
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dignity as entailing a baseline of affirmative material support– 16 and to date this work has not 
sought to focus specifically on the issue of abortion.  
Without such a theoretical account of dignity and its potential relationship to rights to 
abortion, it is, moreover, extremely difficult to justify much of the existing reliance on the idea 
of human dignity in countries such as Germany, Brazil, Colombia and Australia, and also 
internationally. This is because in all of these contexts a core part of the concern of relevant 
decision-makers has been with the connection between human dignity and physical and 
psychological health, rather than simply human dignity and individual liberty or decisional 
autonomy.  
In this essay, we therefore offer the beginnings of a more complete theoretic account of 
the link between ideas about human dignity and constitutional abortion rights. We do so by 
drawing on the capabilities-based approach developed by one of us elsewhere;17 and by 
explaining for the first time in detail the logical implications of such an approach for the 
constitutional regulation of abortion. 
The essay proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a basic explanation and outline of the 
capabilities approach; and the capabilities most directly relevant to the abortion context. Part II 
considers the implications of a capabilities approach and a concern for human dignity for the 
treatment of fetal life, and the degree to which such considerations may provide support for some 
form of ceiling, as well as a floor, on basic rights of access to abortion. Part III considers the 
potential practical pay-off for reproductive rights advocates, in the context of issues such as the 
public funding of abortion and health-based arguments for access to abortion, of being able to 
connect the idea of dignity in an abortion context to a capabilities approach. 
Part I.  A Capabilities Approach and Abortion 
The Capabilities Approach, a theoretical approach to quality of life assessment and to 
theorizing about basic social justice, emerged as an alternative, in the global development 
context, to theories that focus on economic growth as the main indicator of a nation or region’s 
quality of life. Departing from this narrow economic focus—which fails even to ask about the 
distribution of social wealth—the CA (as we shall henceforth call it) holds that the key question 
to ask, when comparing societies and assessing them for their decency or justice is, “What is 
each person able to do and to be?” In other words, like the Kantian approach mentioned above, it 
treats each person as an end, asking not just about the total or average achievements of a nation, 
                                                      
16 For this distinction between dignity in the Kantian sense, and dignity in the baseline sense, see Rosalind Dixon, 
Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong Form versus Weak Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 
ICON 391, 400-401 (2007). 
17 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CA(2000); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006) [hereinafter 
FRONTIERS]; Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 FEM. ECON. 
33 (2003); Martha C. Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities: Supreme Court Foreword: “Perception” Against 
Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2007) [hereinafter Constitutions and Capabilities]. The relationship 
between Nussbaum's version of the approach and that of Amartya Sen is discussed in Nussbaum, Capabilities as 
Fundamental Entitlements, supra, and the entire related group of theories is discussed in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (forthcoming May 2011). 
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but about the opportunity set available to each person. It is focused on choice or freedom, 
holding that the crucial thing societies should be promoting for their people is a set of 
opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which people then may or may not exercise in action: the 
choice is theirs. It thus commits itself to respect for people’s powers of self-definition. The 
approach is resolutely pluralist about value: it holds that the capability achievements that are 
central for people are different in quality, not just in quantity, that they cannot without distortion 
be reduced to a single numerical scale, and that a crucial part of understanding and producing 
them is an understanding of the specific nature of each. It ascribes an urgent task to government 
and public policy: namely the improvement of quality of life for all people, as defined by their 
capabilities.  
So much is common to various users of the approach. In Nussbaum’s specific version, 
these ideas are used as building blocks of a minimal theory of social justice, in combination with 
an idea of human dignity. The idea is that a minimally just society is one that secures to all 
citizens a threshold level of a list of key entitlements, on the grounds that such entitlements are 
requisite of a life worthy of human dignity. (There is also an account of the entitlements of other 
animal species, and here reference is made to the dignity appropriate to the species in question.) 
The notion of dignity is an intuitive notion that is by no means utterly clear.18 If it is used in 
isolation, as if it is utterly self-evident, it can be used capriciously and inconsistently. Thus it 
would be mistaken to use it if it were an intuitive self-evident and solid foundation for a theory 
that would then be built upon it. The CA does not do this: dignity is one element of the theory, 
but all of its notions are seen as interconnected, deriving illumination and clarity from one 
another. But the basic idea is that some living conditions deliver to people a life that is worthy of 
the human dignity that they possess, and others do not. In the latter circumstance, they retain 
dignity, but it is like a promissory note whose claims have not been met. As Martin Luther King, 
Jr. said of the promises inherent in national ideals: dignity can be like “a check that has come 
back marked ‘insufficient funds.’” 
Although the idea of dignity is a vague idea that needs to be given content by placing it in a 
network of related notions, it does make a difference. A focus on dignity is quite different, for 
example, from a focus on satisfaction. Think about debates concerning education for people with 
severe cognitive disabilities. It certainly seems possible that satisfaction, for many such people, 
could be produced without educational development. The arguments that opened the public 
schools to such people used, at crucial junctures, the notion of dignity: we do not treat a child 
with Down syndrome in a manner commensurate with that child’s dignity if we fail to develop 
the child’s powers of mind through suitable education. In a wide range of areas, moreover, a 
focus on dignity will dictate policy choices that protect and support agency, rather than choices 
that infantilize people and treat them as passive recipients of benefit.  
So far, the CA looks like a close relative of the Kantian notions mentioned above, and this 
is not altogether wrong. On the other hand, the CA conceives of the human being as inherently 
animal and a member of the natural world. Dignity is something in and of this world, not 
something belonging to a noumenal realm of freedom impervious to worldly accidents. This 
                                                      
18  See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: 
ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 351 (Adam Schulman & Martha C. 
Nussbaum, eds., 2008). 
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emphasis leads the CA to take issue with Kantian ideas in two ways. First, whereas Kant 
conceives of our human dignity as residing entirely in rationality, the CA understands the basis 
of human dignity far more inclusively: human dignity inheres in sentience, emotion, affection, 
physical health, and appetite as well as in rationality. Thus it can see human beings with severe 
cognitive disabilities as full equals in human dignity, and damages to any of these elements as 
assaults on human dignity.19 It also recognizes that dignity is not the private possession of the 
human species alone: each animal species possesses a type of dignity. (As in the human case, this 
dignity inheres in the entire organized set of its characteristic capacities, whatever they are in 
each case, and not in any putative set of “higher powers”.20) Second, whereas Kant imagines 
dignity as like a diamond, impervious to the blows and shocks of natural accident, the CA 
imagines it as vulnerable, capable of suffering assaults from the world of nature. When such 
assaults occur, dignity is not removed, but it is profoundly harmed (just as we would say that a 
rape does not remove a woman’s dignity, but does profoundly harm or violate it). From the 
perspective of the CA, then, deprivations of health opportunities or opportunities for emotional 
well-being are just as pertinent to the concept of human dignity as deprivations of liberty of 
choice.  
Another way in which the CA differs from Kantian approaches is in its sensitivity to social 
context. Although at a high level of generality, entitlements are recommended as norms for all 
nations, the nation itself is assigned the task of specifying each of these entitlements more 
concretely. Often different nations will rightly do this in keeping with their specific histories and 
circumstances. For example, a free speech right that suits Germany well (allowing a complete 
ban on antisemitic speech) would be too restrictive in the different social climate of the U. S.: in 
this case, both countries are correct, though they define entitlements differently. In other cases, 
we may feel that a nation's tradition has been used as a mere excuse to avoid the claims of human 
dignity in a given area: thus, the U.S. failure (until very recently) to guarantee even minimal 
health care could be seen as growing out of a distinctive tradition, but it is not for that reason 
right. The only way to adjudicate these difficult cases is by detailed argument in each case: a 
nation must show that its traditions give humanly good reasons, reasons consistent with equal 
human dignity, for defining an entitlement differently.21 
The primary claim of the CA is that each and every person is entitled to a minimum 
threshold level of ten central capabilities or opportunities, and that the job of securing these is 
that of the state in which they live (in some cases with the assistance of global redistribution).22 
What does this approach imply for abortion rights? The CA does not follow Kant in grounding 
dignity in rationality alone: it recognizes a variety of ways in which laws restricting abortion 
may burden or violate the dignity of women: by restriction of liberty and choice, but also by 
damage or risks to health, bodily integrity, emotional well-being, employment options, and 
affiliations. All of these are similar threats to human dignity, because human dignity is 
understood as involving the “animal” side of human nature as well as the side that chooses. 
Indeed, the two “sides” are understood as thoroughly interwoven: giving someone a life worthy 
                                                      
19  Thus not people in a permanent vegetative condition, or anencephalic infants, but all children born of human 
parents, and who possess some minimum level of sentience and striving.  
20   NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 17 at 346-52. 
21   NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 17 at 78-80. 
22  For the list, see Appendix. On global redistribution, see NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS, supra note 17 at ch. 5.  
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of human dignity requires not just giving some food, but giving choices regarding nutrition; not 
just health, but choice regarding health. Only then can these “animal” functions be performed in 
a way worthy of human dignity. The policy direction of this theoretical conception is thus clear: 
laws should not simply shield women from a variety of burdens, it should create full-fledged 
capabilities, or opportunities for choice, in each area.  
Part II.  A Capabilities Approach and Fetal Life 
 
It is, of course, important to note that the idea of human dignity has not only been invoked 
by those supporting a right on the part of women to legal access to abortion. It has also been used 
in various contexts by opponents of abortion, and indeed also by various constitutional courts, as 
supporting arguments in favor of the protection of fetal life. In Germany in the Abortion I case, 
for example, the GFCC not only recognized that the fetus enjoyed constitutional protection under 
the Basic Law’s guarantee of the right to life.23 It also held that this right should be understood 
through the prism of its “relationship to human dignity [as] the center of the value system of the 
constitution.”24 Likewise in the U.S., in Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II)25 in the context of 
attempts by Congress’ to ban certain procedures used to conduct late-term abortions (intact 
dilation and extraction or “D&X”), the Court suggested that by “proscrib[ing] a method of 
abortion in which a fetus is killed just inches before completion of the birth process”, the 
Congressional statute in question “expresse[d] respect for the dignity of human life”.26 
Under the CA itself, it is plausible to make similar arguments about the standing of the 
fetus. A CA sees human beings with severe cognitive disabilities as full equals in human dignity. 
It also recognizes that dignity is not the private possession of the human species: each animal 
species possesses a type of dignity. And while the fetus does not possess a great deal in the way 
of agency, it does appear to have a stronger claim to agency than a person in a permanent 
vegetative condition (not a bearer of dignity, according to the CA), because it is at least 
potentially sentient and an agent. So it would seem inconsistent if the CA refused all moral status 
to the fetus. And indeed the CA does recognize that the fetus possesses a type of human 
dignity—although its dependent and merely potential status means that its type of dignity is 
distinctive, and not directly commensurable with that of independent human beings. The CA, 
then, both grants the fetus a type of (potential) human dignity and (in its focus on agency and 
striving) explains why that status is distinct from that of post-birth human beings. Because of 
this, in some sub-set of constitutional contexts (i.e. those that in general a draw close connection, 
in constitutional terms, between shared national values and a duty on the part of the state to 
advance those values), to some degree the CA may also support, rather than undermine, the 
validity of the state imposing some form of ceiling on legal access to abortion. But, even if this is 
so, the recognition of the fetus as having potential standing under a CA does not undermine the 
case a CA makes for recognizing some form of legal floor regarding access to abortion—or, 
depending on the context, for states giving constitutional or quasi-constitutional status to 
                                                      
23  See translation of Abortion I in KOMMERS, supra note 8 at 338 
24  Id. at 339. 
25  550 U.S. 124 (2007).  
26  Id. at 156-157. 
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abortion rights at least within certain “central ranges”, common to the constitutional systems of 
most countries that permit legal access to abortion.27  
Among such countries, there is a clear “overlapping consensus”28 in favor of permitting 
access to abortion where a woman’s life or health is at stake; and also broad (if somewhat lesser) 
recognition of a legal right of access to abortion where a pregnancy is the result of sexual 
violence or continuing a pregnancy would otherwise impose a particularly serious burden on a 
woman.29 A CA also provides a variety of reasons to support recognizing legal access to abortion 
in each of these circumstances.  
Prior to the viability of the fetus ex utero, the continued existence of the fetus as a being 
entitled to human dignity is entirely contingent on the provision of affirmative support by a 
woman.30 In these circumstances, a fetus cannot be said to have a “right to life” unless, from a 
normative perspective, a woman is also under a corresponding duty to provide such affirmative 
support.31 In a liberal society which prizes individual autonomy, there will also be few 
circumstances in which it is legitimate—from the standpoint of notions of equal justice– to 
impose such a duty.32  
Such a duty certainly could not reasonably be said to arise where a woman’s own life was 
in danger if she continues a pregnancy to term, given her right, as a normative matter, to engage 
                                                      
27  For the idea of central ranges as applied to various rights, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). On 
the potential for such protections to take different constitutional form, or indeed quasi- or sub- constitutional, form, 
according to the context, see also id; Reva Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical 
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L. J. 815 (2007) [Hereinafter Sex Equality Arguments] 
28  On the idea of, and significance, of an overlapping consensus of this kind from a normative perspective, 
compare RAWLS, supra 27 at 212-20. 
29  See Center for Reproductive Rights, The World’s Abortion Laws 2009 Factsheet, online at: 
http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/world-abortion-laws-2009-fact-sheet (Oct. 2009); Susheela Singh et. al., 
Abortion Worldwide: A Decade of Uneven Progress, Guttmacher Insitute 50 (2009). For a broader survey of global 
abortion laws, see also e.g. United Nations, Abortion Politics: A Global Review (2002), online at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/; Rosalind Dixon & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of 
Constitutional Convergence (Working Paper 2010); Seigel, Sex Equality Arguments, supra note 27. 
30  After viability, there is perhaps greater scope for disagreement among reasonable persons as to how the balance 
ought to be struck between the constitutional rights or interests of the fetus, and those of the woman, because for 
some, the importance of human life as a constitutional value will mean that the claims of the fetus should take 
priority except in cases where the life of a woman is at stake. However, for those who see human dignity as the 
“center of the value system of the constitution” (compare Abortion I, translated in KOMMERS, supra note 8 at 339), 
there will still be an argument that in some cases a physical or mental health exception should be allowed – because, 
for example, continuing a pregnancy prevents a woman from obtaining treatment (such as chemotherapy) that is 
critical for her own health, risks triggering a serious latent illness, or requires a woman to give birth to a child she 
knows will die shortly after birth, and is subject to other severe forms of impairment: compare e.g. Llantoy, supra 
note 13.  
31  Cf. Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 
(1913); Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., 47, 56 (1971).  
32  See Jarvis Thomson, supra note 31 at 51-53.  
8 
in at least certain limited forms of self-defense.33 A similar self-defense argument can be made in 
cases in which the woman risks severe bodily injury. 
If a pregnancy threatens seriously to undermine a woman’s physical or psychological 
health, because of the danger associated with the pregnancy itself, or the trauma associated with 
giving birth to a child who is the result of sexual violence or subject to the severe impairments, 
in most instances it would also be unreasonable in a liberal society, which generally prizes 
individual human dignity over notions of communal obligation, to impose such a duty, even if 
fetal itself has a claim to be treated with dignity.34 As part I notes, one of the key contributions of 
the CA in this area is to make clear how and why health is central to a woman’s own dignity.35 
One of the benefits of this is that it makes clear how it is that any demand a woman makes to 
access an abortion on therapeutic grounds is based on claims with the same type of normative 
force as those made on behalf of the fetus, and therefore why it would be unreasonable for the 
state to seek systematically to prefer one of these claims, over another, by (for example) broadly 
criminalizing access to abortion.36 Once we add recognition of the potential and dependent status 
of the pre-viability fetus, the degree of normative force in the woman’s claim seems, as a general 
matter, stronger.  
A similar analysis also applies, under a CA, in circumstances where a woman claims that 
if she were denied access to an abortion, she would lose all meaningful chance to determine the 
future shape of her life.37 Not only would a woman in such circumstances lose the opportunity to 
exercise a central human capability—i.e., her capacity for practical reason. The possibility that 
this could occur, even where sex is fully protected, could also serve to discourage women more 
generally from forming the kind of intimate relationship, or seeking the kind of sexual pleasure, 
that is integral to the opportunity for a life worthy of full human dignity. Again, the woman (or 
women) in this context also invoke(s) the same type of normative claim that is made on behalf of 
                                                      
33  See Jarvis Thomson, supra note 31 at 60-64. As Cass Sunstein notes, any notion that the act of a woman in 
refusing such support is in fact active killing, rather than a more passive refusal to provide affirmative support, rests 
on deeply gendered, stereotypical assumptions about women’s presumptive or baseline role in society: see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special References to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35 (1992) [hereinafter Neutrality]. 
34  Compare Jarvis Thomson, supra note 31 at 58-60, 64 (making similar arguments, though not ones based on the 
same language of capabilities); Paul Freund, Storms over the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J 1474 (1983). Jarvis 
Thomson raises the possibility that, in some circumstances, where a woman could be shown affirmatively to have 
assumed the risk of pregnancy – with full knowledge of its potential risks and consequences– a different position 
might apply. Like Jarvis Thomson, however, we believe that in practice such cases would tend to be relatively rare, 
and that in any event, such considerations would only justify constraints on women’s access to abortion in limited 
circumstances, where, for example, the costs to her in terms of dignity of continuing a pregnancy were relatively 
insignificant.  
35  See part I supra.  
36  One argument that is sometimes made to the contrary is that a woman’s claim in this context is of lesser 
standing because she voluntarily assumed the risk of pregnancy. At most, however, such an argument could only 
legitimately be deemed to apply in very narrow circumstances – where a woman had truly voluntary, unprotected 
sexual intercourse with full knowledge of the potential risks of pregnancy that entailed: compare Jarvis Thomson, 
supra note 31 at 58-59; Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 33 at 41.  
37  In many countries, this is recognized by the provision for access to abortion after a process of counseling and 
deliberation, and in others, by provision for access to abortion in cases of “social emergency”: see e.g. Abortion II, 
supra note 7.  
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the fetus, but the asymmetry between a potential and an actual being suggests that, pre-viability, 
the woman’s claim should in general prevail. 
Consistent with this understanding, in comparative constitutional jurisprudence there is 
broad recognition, even amongst most constitutional courts that explicitly recognize the fetus as 
having constitutional standing, that clear limits exist as to when the state may reasonably require 
a woman to continue a pregnancy to term.38 The GFCC, for example, has held that, even though 
the fetus possesses human dignity from the moment of conception, and the state is affirmatively 
obliged under Art 2 of the Basic Law to protect fetal life, a woman’s right to freedom and dignity 
mean that cannot “exact” from a woman the continuation of a pregnancy where this would 
involve “unreasonable demands.”39 In France, in the face of statutory principles that enshrine a 
“principle of respect for all human beings from the inception of life”,40 the Conseil 
Constitutionel has likewise held the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act is consistent with 
both statutory and constitutional principles, given that the Act both limits the circumstances in 
which abortion is available (to cases in which there are therapeutic grounds for an abortion or 
“reasons of distress”, and is designed to respect the “freedom of persons” (i.e. the woman). 41  
For those who advocate moral standing for the fetus, under a CA or otherwise, it is also 
important to recognize what this entails for the practice of sex-selective abortion common in 
many parts of the developed and developing world, particularly the nations of East and South 
Asia.42 Sex-selective abortions affect human capabilities in two different ways: instrumental and 
intrinsic. Instrumentally, such abortions serve to perpetuate denigrating stereotypes of the worth 
of female life; and also, in many cases, to reinforce gender-based hierarchies in social and 
economic life. Intrinsically, they constitute a statement that expresses the unequal worth of 
female life, and they also constitute a type of discrimination: the fetus, which has some standing, 
is harmed because it is female. Here we see the value in allowing the fetus to have moral 
standing: not any and every claim of the parents, but only a claim securely grounded in 
protection of the woman’s central capabilities, will clearly trump the claim of the fetus. “I must 
protect my health” has one kind of force; “I don’t want to pay a dowry” or “I am longing for 
sons”, quite another.  
                                                      
38  One exception is Poland: see Family Planning Act Amendment, K. 26/96 (1997). 
39  See KOMMERS, supra note 8 at 353. See also Mary Anne Case, Perfectionism and Fundamentalism in the 
Application of the German Abortion Laws, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Susan Williams, ed. 2009).  
40  See Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, Decision 74-54 DC (1975).  
41  Id. 
42  For data see JEAN DRÈZE & AMARTYA SEN, INDIA: DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION 257-62 (2002). Natality 
ratios (the biologically common ratio being 95 girls born to 100 boys) suggest a high rate of sex-selective abortion 
not only in poorer nations with low levels of female education and economic participation (such as India, with 92.7 
girls for 100 boys), but also in Singapore (92/100), Taiwan (92/100), South Korea (88/100), and China (86/100). 
Wide regional differences exist within India, corresponding to cultural differences.  
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Part III.  Reproductive Rights Advocacy and a Capabilities Approach 
Theories shape practical debates, for better or worse. For many years, the equation of 
economic growth with improvement in quality of life skewed the emphasis of public policy. 43 
Similarly, Kantian and other theories that equated human dignity with rationality contributed to 
the marginalization of people with severe cognitive disabilities. Getting the theories out into the 
open and articulating them with clarity is important, so that we can challenge what we find 
defective once we see it plainly. And when a defective theory exercises wide influence on public 
policy, articulating a counter-theory is usually the best way of clearing the way for a more 
adequate set of policies. In one sense, the CA does not say anything that non-theoretical people 
themselves could not say, if given the chance. It does, however, provide an explicit critique of 
what is defective in dominant theoretical approaches, at the same time spelling out a richer set of 
goals with clarity. In the abortion area as well, it has distinct advantages over other theoretical 
paradigms, not only as Part I has argued, in its ability to explain the connection between human 
dignity in the baseline sense and rights of access to abortion, but also in its capacity to shed light 
on existing state practices regarding public funding for abortion and on the deficiencies of 
“women protective” anti-abortion arguments.44  
The CA, as part I notes, helps show why, as a normative matter, rights of access to 
abortion should be understood in terms that refer both to barriers against state interference and to 
affirmative duties on the part of the state to provide support. A life with human dignity requires 
protection of all the Central Capabilities up to a minimum threshold level: but all are conceived 
as opportunities for choice, and thus none has been secured unless the person has the opportunity 
to exercise choice in matters of actual functioning.  
A CA also help show the close connection between autonomy and health-based reasons 
for allowing access to abortion, in a way that can help highlight the deep normative 
inconsistency in allowing women access abortion on health grounds, while at the same time 
denying her capacity for rational decision-making about her health. Under the CA, practical 
reason is not merely one capability on the list: it also suffuses and shapes all the others, making 
their pursuit truly worthy of human dignity. By providing a theoretical vocabulary in which these 
interrelationships are articulated, the CA thus gives advocates and policy-makers a way of 
articulating these claims that is richer and more precise that that promised by Kantian or 
narrowly economic approaches.  
 In the U.S. in particular, given the nature of ongoing controversies surrounding access to 
abortion, both of these theoretical insights are likely to be especially valuable. Access to abortion 
for poor women remains a major issue in many states in the U.S. in the wake of the 1977 Hyde 
Amendment restricting access to abortion under federal Medicaid programs in all but the most 
                                                      
43  See Joseph E. Stiglitz et. al., Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and 
Social Progress (2009), online at: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.stiglitz-sen-
fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf . 
44  See Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection supra note1; Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: 
An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 [hereinafter The New 
Politics of Abortion].  
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extreme circumstances,45 which the Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) 
upheld as constitutional. 46 There have also been increasing challenges in the U.S. in recent years 
to legal rights of access to therapeutic abortions, or certain abortion procedures designed to 
protect women’s health, based on women protective anti-abortion arguments.47 Following 
Carhart II in which the Supreme Court dismissed a facial challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003 (Act),48 it is illegal in almost all cases in the U.S. for medical practitioners to 
use D&X procedures in order to perform a late-term abortion. In eight states, there is also 
legislation that (at least prima facie) prohibits the use of all abortion procedures (including non-
intact dilation and extraction (D&E)) post-viability, unless they are necessary to save the life of a 
woman, or justified on very limited health-grounds.49 In the earlier stages of pregnancy, at least 
until recently, there have also been concerted attempts to limit access to RU486 or medical 
abortion, as another medically beneficial abortion option for many women.50  
In other countries, however, there are also similar ongoing controversies surrounding 
access to abortion services. While most countries that allow legal access to abortion, other than 
the U.S., also provide at least some form of public funding for abortion, in many countries there 
also continue to be important gaps in the adequacy and universality of such funding.51 As to 
                                                      
45  Many recent proposals to expand health-care coverage for uninsured Americans also specifically exclude the 
possibility of indirect government funding for abortion services: see e.g. Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the 
matter: Public Funding of Abortion for Poor Women in the United States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 12 (2007). 
46  See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (holding, in the context of provisions of the Hyde 
Amendment preventing use of Medicaid funds for all abortions – including medically necessary abortions –the 
Court held that: “[a]lthough the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against government 
interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to 
such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom”). See also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 
475 (1977) (holding in the context of state-based limitations on public funding for non-medically necessary 
abortions that “[t]he indigency that may make it difficult -- and in some cases, perhaps, impossible -- for some 
women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by” state law and therefore such laws were “not 
[an impingement] upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe”). 
47  Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 44; Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 1.  
48  18 U. S. C.§1531 (2000 ed., Supp. IV) 
49  See Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: State Policies on Late Term Abortions (2010), online at: 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf (listing 10 states that impose such procedural 
restrictions, and 8 states that impose relevant substantive limitations). 
50  See Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 44; Siegel, Dignity and the Abortion Debate, supra note 
2; Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 1. See also e.g. arguments in a “citizen’s petition” by W. 
David Hager, member of the FDA Advisory Committee for Reproductive Health Drugs, that mifepristone 
“endangers the lives and health of women” see American Association of Pro Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
Petition Filed with FDA Regarding Seriously Flawed Mifeprex (RU-486) Approval Process, Aug. 20, 2002 (cited in 
NARAL, The Safety of Legal Abortion and the Hazards of Illegal Abortion, online at: 
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/issues/abortion/medical-abortion/mifepristone-abortion-politics.html, which 
continues a reliance on such arguments). 
51  In some cases, this is because of an unwillingness on the part of public, as well as private, hospitals to provide 
abortion services: see e.g. Center for Reproductive Rights, Center Praises Momentous Decision in Abortion case in 
Columbia (Oct. 2009), http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/center-praises-momentous-decision-in-abortion-
case-in-colombia (discussing the Constitutional Court’s ruling that institutions had to ensure that they had qualified 
medical staff on hand to perform abortions, a decree that was later suspended by the Council of State. See Neda 
Vanovac, State Council Suspends Abortion Decree, COLOMB. REP. (Oct 22, 2009), 
http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/6522-state-council-suspends-abortion-decree.html); in others it is 
because of budgetary short-falls: see e.g.Women ‘Forced to Pay for Private Abortions’, BBC News (Dec. 7, 1999), 
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women-protective anti-abortion arguments, there has also been a rise in the prevalence of such 
arguments outside the U.S. in recent years. Such arguments have been voiced in the context of 
the deliberations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe52 and also hearings of 
the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.53 More 
recently, such arguments have also been made in domestic courts such as the High Court of New 
Zealand, in the context of a challenge to the administration and supervision of various exceptions 
to the general prohibition on abortion under s. 183 of the Crimes Act.54  
In almost all these contexts, and particularly in the U.S., there is also some existing at 
least quasi-constitutional commitment to recognizing the importance of human dignity, either in 
a Kantian or baseline sense, in the context of rights of access to abortion, that provides a natural 
starting point for reproductive rights advocates in seeking to make arguments based on a CA.55  
Across a wide variety of contexts, therefore, the CA has the potential to make a 
difference to existing rights of access to abortion on the ground—particularly if it is used by 
                                                                                                                                                                              
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/553204.stm (discussing the situation in the UK in the early 1990’s). In yet others, 
threats to the public funding of abortion arise because of political opposition to access to at least certain forms of 
abortion: see e.g. Don MacPherson, Morgantaler wins NB Challenge for Funding Abortions, EDMONTON SUN (May 
21, 2009), http://www.edmontonsun.com/news/canada/2009/05/21/9530486.html (describing challenges in New 
Brunswick, Canada to funding for medically necessary abortions); Barnett calls for action on late-term abortions, ABC 
NEWS (Dec 22, 2008),  
 http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/12/22/2452586.htm?site=news (describing political challenges to the 
public funding of late-term abortions in Australia). 
52  See discussion in Siegel, Dignity and the Abortion Debate, supra note 2 at *5.  
53  See "Abortion Bad For Women," Protests United Nations Women's Representative (July 21, 2005), available at: 
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2005/jul/05072102.html (citing arguments by Hungarian me mber of the 
Committee, Krisztina Morvai, that "One thing that is invisible and lost in the debate is that abortion is bad for 
women….No woman actually wants to have an abortion. We have this illusion that women have free choices. But 
abortion is a terribly damaging thing psychologically, spiritually and physically"). 
54  See Right to Life New Zealand Inc. v. Abortion Supervisory Committee, [2008] 2 NZLR 825 para. 152 (noting 
that “there is expert evidence that abortions can have adverse psychological side-effects, although the existence and 
extent of such problems is controversial” but declining to deal with the issue). For ongoing controversy surrounding 
the administration of the Act, see also Right to Life v. Abortion Supervisory Committee (Unreported High Court 
judgment No 2 of Miller J, 20 July 1999). 
55  In the U.S., there is a particularly strong constitutional grounding for both dignity as liberty and dignity as 
equality as applied to the abortion context: see e.g. Roe, supra note 2; McRae, 448 U.S. at 316 (noting that “it could 
be argued that the freedom of a woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons does, in fact, 
lie at the core of the constitutional liberty identified in Wade”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (affirming “the right of the 
woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State” and 
the right of women, post-viability, to access medically necessary abortions). However, in many other countries that 
have recently experienced debates over access to public funding for abortion, or the rise of women-protective anti-
abortion arguments, there is also some form of quasi-constitutional commitment to recognizing the importance of 
either dignity as liberty, or dignity in the baseline sense, that provides a starting place for making such arguments in 
the political sphere: see e.g. Right to Life [2008] 2 NZLR 825 par 77 (holding in the context of statutory provisions 
allowing abortion in circumstances where “the continuance of the pregnancy would result in serious danger (not 
being danger normally attendant upon childbirth) to the life, or to the physical or mental health, of a woman or girl) 
that “from the perspective of a woman who wants an abortion, pregnancy and childbirth impose burdens of a 
profound and private nature, affecting her physical autonomy, her health, her relationships and her socio-economic 
status). 
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reproductive rights advocates so as to complement or supplement, rather than wholly replace, 
existing constitutional discourses—such as the language of gender equality. 
The CA draws a close connection between human dignity and human equality. The 
dignity of all human beings (who possess a minimum of agency and sentience) is held to be 
fundamentally equal.56 The deep equality of human beings does not necessarily mean that they 
are only treated justly if they are treated alike: it remains to be seen, in each area, what sort of 
treatment sufficiently acknowledges the fact of human equality. In some areas (voting, religious 
liberty) it will readily be agreed that the recognition of human equality (treating as equals) 
requires equal treatment: giving some people more votes than others would be offensive to their 
equal human dignity. In other areas (e.g. education) it remains controversial whether respect for 
human equality requires giving equal educational provisions.57 In yet other areas (e.g. housing), 
it may seem that respect for human equality requires only a threshold of adequacy, not similar 
housing for all. But one thing that is clearly unacceptable is to give a disadvantage or burden to a 
group within the population that is already marginalized or disadvantaged on other grounds: this 
insight, which lies behind modern Equal Protection Clause review, is also articulated by the 
CA.58 This insight will show us why the CA supports a common form of argument for abortion 
rights based on women’s equality.  
In many countries, as a matter of existing constitutional practice, there is also an 
extremely close link between, on the one hand, constitutional commitments to human dignity, 
and on the other, constitutional guarantees of equality. Indeed, in countries such as Canada, 
Germany and South Africa, perhaps the most important determinant of whether a constitutional 
guarantee of equality is violated is in fact whether a measure adversely affects individual 
dignity—in the sense of an individual’s sense of self-worth, or enjoyment of respect from 
others.59 In the United States, there are also arguable emerging traces of such an understanding in 
the jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy.60 In the specific context of abortion, as Canadian Justice 
Wilson noted in Morgentaler, there is also a particularly close connection between the struggle 
for human dignity and gender equality, given that for many women the struggle for reproductive 
rights advocates is parallel to previous struggles by men to “assert their common humanity and 
dignity against an overbearing state apparatus”, such that “the right to reproduce or not to 
reproduce … is properly perceived as an integral part of modern woman’s struggle to assert her 
dignity and worth as a human being.”61  
At a more theoretic level, Kenneth Karst, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Cass Sunstein and Reva 
Siegel, among others, have further made powerful equality-based arguments in favor of 
                                                      
56  See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 18 at ch. 5.  
57  See id. (arguing that it does). 
58  See Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 17.  
59  In Canada, see e.g. Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S. C. R. 497; in South Africa, see e.g President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another v. Hugo, [1997] ZACC 4; Harksen v. President of South Africa and Others, [2000] ZACC 
29; City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, [1998] ZACC 1; Khosa v. The Minister of Social Development, [2003] CCT 
13/03.  
60  Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 1(noting the idea of dignity as equality in various US 
Supreme Court opinions). 
61  See Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 172 (emphasis in original). 
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recognizing a constitutional right of access to abortion.62 Sunstein argues that the imposition of a 
burden of life-support on women, given that they are already a “suspect class” for Equal 
Protection purposes, is unconstitutional, even if we should grant for the sake of argument that the 
fetus is a full person—in much the way that a law requiring all and only African-Americans to 
make kidney donations would be unconstitutional.63 Karst’s argment rests, instead, on a notion of 
equal citizenship, taken to mean equality of legal and social status.64 The choice to become a 
parent, he argues, is, among other things, a choice of a social role or status. For the state to deny 
such a choice is for society to deny the person’s equal worth.65 Ginsburg makes similar 
arguments. Siegel argues that restrictions on abortion not only express invidious stereotypes 
about women’s role, but also create a caste-like hierarchy by increasing women’s dependence on 
men and impairing women’s access to sexual pleasure.66  
All such arguments, however, gain in clarity when they are expressed in connection with 
an idea of human capabilities. We always need to say in what respect people are equal or 
unequal, and assessing capability equality and inequality is particularly pertinent to Equal 
Protection analysis.67 Compared to an abstract equality-based approach to reproductive rights 
advocacy, an approach that seeks to ground the relevant equalities in the idea of human 
capabilities is, in our view, likely to offer a more robust basis for defending abortion rights in 
many countries– at least over the long-term. 
Equality arguments are important, since they may persuade people who are convinced 
that the fetus has a moral status fully equal to that of a born person. They are, however, 
historically contingent: they depend on a finding that a given classification is “suspect” for Equal 
Protection purposes, and this, in turn, depends upon finding that it suffers from (at least) a 
history of discrimination. If women were ever fully equal in a given society, however, they—like 
all the other people in that society—would still need protections for choice across the entire list 
of the capabilities, and such guarantees are not supplied by the reliance on equality alone.68 Laws 
forbidding marriages of white and black could be struck down on Equal Protection grounds, as 
they were. Laws prohibiting the marriages of Episcopalians and Presbyterians, should they exist, 
would be profoundly offensive to the idea of minimal social justice, even though they would not 
involve an equality component. The CA reminds us that the protection of human dignity requires 
the protection of spheres of choice and bodily and mental health in all contexts, not just a 
                                                      
62  See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Supreme Court Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Equal Citizenship]; Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 33; Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Equality and Autonomy in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 
(1985); Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 1; Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 
44.  
63  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). See also Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 33. 
64  Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 62 
65  Id. at 32.  
66  See Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 1; Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments, supra note 27. 
67  See Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 17 on a range of equal protection cases, esp. Justice 
Ginsburg in U. S v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  
68 Compare VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 210-22 (2009) 
(exploring the distinction between equality and liberty as basis for recognizing rights of access to abortion); Siegel, 
Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 1 (distinguishing notions of “dignity as liberty” and “dignity as 
equality”). 
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situation in which interference is equal for all. In that sense, it not only builds on, but also 
enriches the current global constitutional jurisprudence connecting legal rights of access to 
abortion to the idea of respect for human dignity. 
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APPENDIX 
The Central Human Capabilities 
 
 1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or 
before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living. 
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be 
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent 
assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual 
satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and 
reason -- and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a way informed and cultivated by an 
adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and 
scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing 
and producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. 
Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with 
respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have 
pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love 
those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to 
experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development 
blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human 
association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.) 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience 
and religious observance.)  
7. Affiliation.  
 A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other 
human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the 
situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and 
nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political 
speech.) 
 B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as 
a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national 
origin.  
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8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the 
world of nature. 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control over one's Environment. 
 A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's 
life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association. 
 B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having 
property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal 
basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able 
to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships 
of mutual recognition with other workers. 
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